to be neither black nor white but mostly grey.

To repeat, this is a fine study and a true contribution to knowledge which deserves to be translated into both Polish and English.

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Yisrael Gutman. *The Jews of Warsaw, 1939-1943: Ghetto, Underground, Revolt.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1982. Pp. 487.

Warsaw, excepting Auschwitz itself, was the very center of the Holocaust where the skeins of Nazi atrocities converged, but unlike Auschwitz, Warsaw was also a city of Jewish resistance and revolt. The author expertly documents Jewish life in Warsaw during these years of horror. Although all aspects of Jewish life are discussed, the book emphasizes Jewish "underground" life — the gathering of resistance which culminated in the 29 heroic days of revolt in April/May 1943. This is the fullest and most authoritative, though perhaps not the most colorful, account of Jews in wartime Warsaw to be found.

The most controversial chapter of the book deals with Jewish/Polish relations during the Holocaust years. Gutman treats this sensitive topic with considerable subtlety and represents some departure from the post-war accusatory tone that Jewish authors took towards the Poles. The author makes some germane and valuable distinctions between the situations in Poland and other German occupied territories in Europe. I think he correctly avoids using the word "collaborator" in the Polish situation, for in no sense were the Poles Nazi collaborators as there were French collaborators in France. The martial law aspects of the occupation of Poland are made clear enough, but there is one basic omission: it needs to be made manifestly clear that the Germans released their murderous machinery of terror against the Poles in September 1939, before they did so against the Jews. It is a well documented fact that the Einsatzgruppen received their first "field experience" in 1939 by mass killings of Polish administrators and intellectuals in the Wartheland territory. It must also be remembered that the penalty for hiding Jews was death or tantamount to death, whole families being held liable.

The willingness to sacrifice one's life for that of another human being is a noble act — noble because it is so rare. In retrospect it is of course clear that the murder of Jews was a unique and unprecedented historical event, but it may not have seemed that way to the people in whose midst the atrocities ocurred. The author feels that Polish leadership failed the test of humanity by placing the safety of the Polish people before the Jews of Poland. Fair enough and lofty enough, but it must be remembered that the existence of the Polish people was threatened as the existence of Danes in Denmark was not. The authors reproach the Polish people at large for not being more helpful to the Jews headed for gas chambers and suggesting and implying that they failed to do so because of an undercurrent of antisemitism is unfair and indicative of overmoralization and the setting up of a standard that is not likely to be followed by the author himself. I do not think that the situation in Poland for the Jews would have turned out to be any different had there been no antisemitism at all.

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And I am equally certain that the situation in Denmark would have been as bad had the laws of occupation there been equal to those of Poland.

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Ilya Zemtsov. *Andropov: Policy Dilemmas and the Struggle for Power.* Jerusalem: IRICS Publishers, 1983. Pp. 252. Paper.

Iurii Andropov, the fifth ruler of the Soviet Union, already entered into history on two counts: his unexpected succession to Leonid Brezhnev accompanied by almost fantastic rumors revealing only lack of knowledge about the man, and the sudden, prolonged, and equally mysterious, disappearance from the public view. Whatever the future holds for Andropov, it seems to be certain that his rule will not last too long.

Nonetheless, Ilya Zemtsov's first study of Andropov is a most welcome and timely contribution helping to identify this KGB official in the highest position of the Soviet power structure. Zemtsov's background, his intimate familiarity with the Soviet system, his first hand knowledge of important Soviet individuals and information not easily accessible to Westerners, qualify him best for this uneasy assignment.

While focusing on the careers of Andropov, as head of the security police of the Soviet Union, and of Gaidar Aliev, the head of the KGB in Azerbaijan, the author unfolds the history of the struggle for power in the Kremlin, exhibiting familiar themes of Russia's past.

Zemtsov begins with the search for the real Andropov. In his thorough investigation Andropov emerges as a complex personality, intelligent and well-educated by Soviet standards, eloquent, conformist and above all "double think," a must for survival and advancement. Exactly this well-adapted behavior has helped him to advance from basements and factory barracks to the first secretary of the CP. His career typifies the system and his inborn intelligence and shredness served him well in Komsomol, during years of his work for Kusinen (1939-1940), in the Partisan units in Karelia during W.W. II, and then in the Party, the university in Petrozavodsk, the Advanced Party School in Moscow, up to the position of adviser to the Soviet Embassy in Budapest in 1953. Fortune helped him with the Hungarian revolt of 1956, when he played an important role in its suppression and the liquidation of many Hungarian patriots. He welcomed them with smiles and instantly delivered them to the KGB for execution. Moscow appreciated his abilities, and soon after he was rewarded with the greatest responsibility. His appointment as Chairman of the KGB in 1967 "must have appeared to him to be the beginning of the end of his career" (p. 31). However, exactly this position proved to be crucial in his rapid appointment to the Politburo, and after Brezhnev's death, into the highest Party position on November 12, 1982.

Andropov's road to power, struggle for power, and the subsequent holding of power, Zemtsov presented in details unknown to Western experts and this part of the book is the most interesting. However, Chapter 6, "Andropovization of Power," while detecting some reshuffling aimed as the solidification of Andropov's position by bringing into the Politburo, the Party, Army and Administration KGB men,

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